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1. Overview 
To raise employment and output growth in Europe, the leading multilateral economic institutions 
 (EU Commission, IMF, OECD) routinely recommend ‘structural reforms’ of product and labor 
markets that increase competition and employment flexibility. Existing model-based analyses of 
those reforms generally use standard New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) models in which pro-competition reforms are represented as exogenous reductions in 
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markups (see, e.g., Everaert and Schule (2008), Roeger et al. (2008), Gomes et al. (2014) and 
Kollmann et al. (2015)).  
The Cacciatore, Duval, Fiori and Ghironi [‘CDFG’] paper greatly improves the toolbox 
for modeling structural reforms in a DSGE framework, by allowing for richer and more realistic 
firm dynamics and labor market frictions than conventional policy models. This enables the 
paper to highlight important transmission channels of reforms that are ignored by conventional 
models. CDFG consider a two-country world with flexible prices and wages; each country is 
inhabited by a representative family whose members engage in efficient risk sharing. The two 
key features of the CDFG model are endogenous firm entry and exit, and search and matching 
frictions in the labor market. These features allow a rich analysis of price and wage dynamics 
and markups.  In the CDFG framework, a pro-competition product market reform (modeled as a 
reduction in entry barriers) facilitates entry of highly productive new firms, and triggers the exit 
of less productive incumbent firms. This process leads to a reallocation of labor to more 
productive firms that is costly and time consuming (due to the search and matching frictions). In 
the short-run, a product market reform lowers thus domestic output and employment, while 
raising domestic real activity in the long-run. A reduction in job security (cut in worker firing 
costs) is likewise predicted to trigger a short-term output drop, followed by a long-term rise in 
real activity. Interestingly, a cut in unemployment benefits (UB) is predicted to raise 
employment and output, both in the short-run and in the long-run (no intertemporal trade-off), as 
a UB cut does not trigger a rise in job destruction, but leads to an immediate rise in hiring (due to 
a fall in workers’ reservation wages). Importantly, the model predicts that a UB cut boosts output 
more when the economy is in a recession than in normal times. By contrast, the short-term output 
costs of a product market deregulation, and of a cut in firing costs, are greater when these 
reforms are undertaken in a recession, as the labor market is less fluid in a recession (lower job 
finding rate of unemployed workers). The spillover of reforms undertaken in just one country on 
foreign real activity is negative for product market reforms, and positive for labor market 
reforms. However, due to opposing competitiveness and income effects, the cross-country 
spillovers of reforms are generally much weaker than domestic output responses. Product market 
reforms are predicted to worsen the current account of the country that implements these reforms 
(due to a strong rise in domestic investment), while labor market reforms improve the current 
account.  
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2. Comments 
2.1. Empirical evidence on aggregate effects of structural reforms 
Empirical studies generally find that structural reforms increase real activity in the long-run, but 
that their short-term effect on employment and output can be negative; see, e.g., Bouis et al. 
(2012), Babecky and Havranek (2014) and McAdam and Stracca (2015). The CDFG model 
captures that intertemporal tradeoff.
1
 Using panel regressions for OECD countries, Bouis et al. 
(2012) investigate whether the employment effects of structural reforms depend on the phase of 
the business cycle in which the reforms are implemented. Empirically, a reduction in job security 
is less expansionary in a recession than in normal times, which is consistent with the CDFG 
model. The data show also that an unemployment benefits (UB) cut is less expansionary in a 
recession than in normal times; see Bouis et al. (2012), Table 3. The CDFG model fails to 
capture this empirical finding. The analysis below suggests that domestic financial frictions 
might account for the state-dependence of the impact of UB reforms documented by Bouis et al. 
(2012).   
 
2.2. Household heterogeneity, nominal rigidities  
In a world with uninsurable risk, structural reforms may hurt a subset of the population, which 
may make reforms politically costly. Also, nominal rigidities affect the transmission of aggregate 
shocks. The CDFG model abstracts from both issues—it would be very useful to incorporate 
these dimensions into the CDFG framework. By contrast, conventional DSGE policy models 
allow to address distributional issues, as these models typically assume heterogeneous 
households and incomplete markets; furthermore, these models assume nominal rigidities. As an 
example, consider the empirically estimated three-country New Keynesian model presented by 
Kollmann et al. (2015). That model assumes two types of households: ‘Ricardian’ households 
(capitalists) who freely trade in asset markets and own all domestic firms, and financially 
constrained households (workers) who do not hold financial assets. A UB cut raises the incentive 
to work, which lowers the real wage. This triggers a persistent rise in the income and 
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Conventional New Keynesian models too can generate transitory output contractions after 
reforms. With nominal rigidities, a pro-competition reform induces a gradual decline in 
consumer prices which may raise the real interest rate and lower aggregate demand and output in 
the short-run. This mechanism is especially potent when interest rate policy is constrained by the 
zero lower bound (e.g., Eggertsson et al. (2014), Vogel (2014)).  
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consumption of Ricardian households (due to a rise in profits), while the consumption of 
financially constrained households falls persistently (reduction in wage income and in UB 
income). Thus, the consumption responses of the two households are negatively correlated.  
The Kollmann et al. (2015) model also predicts that the adverse effect of a UB cut for 
financially constrained households is stronger in a recession (when more  financially constrained 
households are unemployed) than in normal times. Hence, a UB cut implemented in a recession 
triggers a weaker rise in aggregate demand, GDP and employment, which accords with the 
empirical evidence (see Sect. 2.1). The redistributive effect of a UB cut depends also on the 
adjustment speed of prices and wages. It is weaker under sticky prices and wages than under 
price and wage flexibility. Under nominal rigidities (as assumed in the baseline version of the 
Kollmann et al. (2015) model), aggregate output rises on impact when a UB cut occurs. With 
price and wage flexibility, the real wage falls more rapidly, financially constrained households 
experience a sharper consumption drop, and aggregate GDP falls on impact (but rises in the 
long-run). Hence, nominal rigidities change the sign of the short-term output response to a UB 
cut.  
With household heterogeneity, distributional implications can differ across policy 
measures. For example, in the Kollmann et al. (2015) model, a product market reform 
(represented as a cut in price mark-ups) raises the real income and consumption of financially 
constrained households (workers), while reducing the real income of Ricardian households 
(capitalists). A combination of labor and product market reforms would generate positive 
employment and GDP effects, but dampen the distributional impact associated with the 
individual measures. The packaging of individual measures into reform bundles has been 
advocated in the political economy literature as a strategy to soften distributional conflicts and 
overcome related resistance to reforms (e.g., Drazen (2002)). 
Empirical evidence for OECD countries shows that labor market reforms are typically 
accompanied by product market reforms. As a rough measure, the scatter plot in the Figure 
below shows combinations of labor and product market reforms in OECD countries during the 
years 1998-2003. Labor market reforms are defined as policy measures that trigger a reduction in 
the aggregate index of employment protection legislation (EPL) constructed by the OECD; 
analogously, product market reforms represent reductions in the OECD product market 
regulation (PMR) index. In the Figure, reforms are considered over 5-year intervals (1998-2003, 
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2003-2008, and 2008-2013). Each point represents a combination of changes of EPL and PMR 
indices observed in one of the OECD countries, during one of the 5-year intervals.    
  
 
Source: OECD, own calculations. 
 
With one exception, labor market reforms (observations to the left of the y-axis) have always 
been accompanied by product market reforms (observations below the x-axis) within the 5-year 
intervals in the sample. This may have mitigated the distributional impact of labor market 
deregulation. The Figure shows also that labor market institutions are much more persistent than 
product market regulations. There are many instances of zero change in the EPL index 
(observations on the y-axis), but none of zero change in the PMR index (observations on the x-
axis). While there are several episodes of EPL index increases, only few PMR increases are 
observed. The persistence of EPL may be a reflection of the distributional effects of and 
associated resistance to EPL changes, or an expression of beneficial aspects of EPL (see next 
sub-Section). 
 
2.3. Richer micro-foundations needed for analysis of structural reforms 
In the CDFG world, unemployment insurance (UI) is wasteful because of its disincentive effect 
on labor supply; there is no need for UI because efficient private insurance markets are assumed. 
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In other terms, the CDFG model implies that UI should be abolished. That recommendation has 
to be taken with caution. In a more realistic setting with incomplete financial markets, UI can 
raise welfare and may even lead to higher output (by inducing workers to accept high 
productivity jobs that have high unemployment risk); e.g., Acemoglu and Shimer (1999). A 
balanced assessment of labor market reforms thus requires a model with richer microeconomic 
foundations that capture not only the social costs but also the potential benefits of labor market 
institutions such has UI and job security guarantees.  
 
3. Conclusion 
Cacciatore, Duval, Fiori and Ghironi provide a very valuable contribution that highlights the role 
of firm entry and exit and of labor market frictions for the macroeconomic effects of structural 
reforms. Their work also suggests promising avenues for future research.  
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